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Abstract 
 
In this article, I develop the basis of a normative legal theory of mental health vulnerability. In 
Section 1, I conceptualise mental health vulnerability by integrating a universal 
understanding of vulnerability with a subjective-evaluative, psychosocial and dimensional 
account of mental health. In Section 2, I move on to consider the significance of mental 
health vulnerability for legal theory through an encounter with perspectives on vulnerability 
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offered by MacIntyre, Fineman, and Del Mar. This offers an insight into the normative 
foundations of mental health vulnerability. In Section 3, I outline a normative framework for 
mental health vulnerability that involves a synergy of rights and care. This extends Engster’s 
idea of “a right to care” to mental health and highlights the role of care and rights in 
mitigating power imbalances and inequality in relation to mental health. In concluding, I 
suggest future directions for research on mental health vulnerability. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Mental health and vulnerability both lie at the heart of the human condition. Just as everyone 
experiences a state of mental health, “everyone is vulnerable” (Herring, 2016, p. 7). Today, 
mental health also attracts considerable significance in terms of public health strategies 
(Mental Health Task Force, 2016), global policy initiatives and “sustainable development 
goals” (United Nations General Assembly, 2017, para. 14). Yet the connection between 
mental health and vulnerability is surprisingly neglected in legal theory. Where legal theorists 
have addressed mental health at any length, this has taken place primarily in the context of 
free will, mental disorder and responsibility in criminal and tort law (e.g. Hart, 1968/2008; 
Moore, 1984; Hart and Honoré, 1985) or, from the perspective of therapeutic jurisprudence, 
in terms of the potential of legal phenomena “as a therapeutic agent” (Winick, 1997b, p. 185) 
within and beyond mental health law (e.g. Winick, 1997a and Wexler and Winick (eds) 1996, 
respectively). And, until recently, legal theorists have considered the idea of vulnerability in 
passing if at all (e.g. Hart’s brief discussion of physical vulnerability as a reason for rules 
against violence (1961/2012, pp. 194-95). By contrast, during the last decade, the literature 
considering the relevance of vulnerability to legal theory has burgeoned (e.g. Fineman, 
2008, 2010; Del Mar, 2012; Fineman and Grear, 2013; Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos and 
Webb, 2015). This has been paralleled by a growing literature considering vulnerability in 
relation to specific concepts and debates across legal thought and doctrine, such as dignity 
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(Neal, 2012), caring (Herring, 2013), negligence (Stychin, 2012), disability discrimination 
(Satz, 2008), family law (Collins, 2014), security and public protection (Ramsay, 2012), 
healthcare law (Biggs and Jones, 2014) and the legal understanding of the ‘vulnerable adult’ 
in adult social care (Dunn et al., 2008; Herring, 2016, Clough, 2017). This reflects a broader 
“vulnerability zeitgeist” (Brown et al, 2017, p. 497) that extends beyond legal studies. 
However, the nature of mental health vulnerability remains unexplored. 
 
In this article, I develop the basis of a normative legal theory of mental health vulnerability. 
My focus on, and use of, mental health, is as a fundamental aspect of any human life, 
encompassing good or satisfactory levels of mental health as well as common or severe 
mental health problems (i.e. those that are recognised in psychiatry as diagnosable mental 
disorders/illnesses).1 As such, it is broader than legal understandings of mental disorder, 
mental (in)capacity, mental disability or the legal definition of vulnerable adulthood (for a 
discussion of these, see Dunn et al., 2008; Bartlett and Sandland, 2014, pp. 13-17 and pp. 
173-188; Herring, 2016; Clough, 2017) on which existing legal scholarship concerning 
mental health and vulnerability is typically focused. If legal theory is to fully address the 
nature of this inescapable psychosocial dimension of human existence - and, by implication, 
the needs and claims of all citizens on the basis of their mental health - mental health 
vulnerability cannot be ignored. It therefore offers a timely and important research direction 
for legal and political theory as well as advancing the debate about the nature of vulnerability 
                                                          
1 I use the terms “mental health problems” or “mental distress” in preference to “mental disorder” in 
order to avoid valorising a problematic medicalised conception of mental health suffering and any 
implication that these experiences lack meaning (Bolton, 2007, p. 247; Tew, 2011, pp. 4-5). Bolton 
also notes that the term “‘mental health problems’ … is probably neutral to aetiology” and minimizes 
stigma (2007, p. 248). Although the terminology of mental disorder is often utilised in law, such as in 
s. 1(2) of the Mental Health Act 1983, reference to ‘severe’ mental health problems is sufficiently 
broad to be capable of encompassing those which fall within typical legal definitions. It follows that 
‘mental health problems’ also has the advantage of referring to the experience of less severe forms of 
mental distress for which mental health legislation would not usually be invoked. See Bolton (2007, 
pp. 22-29 and pp. 247-253) and Tew (2011, pp. 4-5) for discussion of these terminological debates. 
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itself. Most importantly, however, it yields insights to further solidarity, compassion and social 
justice in legal and political thought. 
 
In Section 1, I begin by conceptualising vulnerability and mental health. Drawing on a 
universal understanding of vulnerability, in particular Martha Fineman’s vulnerability theory, I 
integrate this with insights from psychological theories of mental health. I argue that mental 
health vulnerability is part of our universal human vulnerability, involving differing levels of 
psychological and relational resilience, and based on an account of mental health which is 
subjective-evaluative, psychosocial and dimensional. This approach accommodates the 
range of influences upon, as well as different levels of, mental health within an account of 
universal vulnerability. In Section 2, I move on to consider the significance of understanding 
mental health vulnerability for legal theory through an encounter with perspectives on 
vulnerability offered by Fineman, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Maksymilian Del Mar. This offers 
an insight into the normative foundations of vulnerability in general and of mental health 
vulnerability in particular. In Section 3, I outline the basis of a desirable normative framework 
for mental health vulnerability. This normative framework has two synergistic features – a 
rights-based element and a care-based element. This synergy involves a rationally justified 
“right to care” (Engster, 2007, p. 53) which supports the solidaristic understanding of mental 
health vulnerability I develop and serves to mitigate imbalances of power in mental health 
and inequalities in the social determinants of mental health. Since my focus is theoretical, 
and for reasons of space, I have little to say here about specific instantiations of policy and 
law, although I refer briefly to occasional examples drawn from public mental health 
promotion strategies like England’s 2016 Mental Health Task Force report and Improving 
Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) programme (Clark, 2012), the 2017 report by the 
United Nations special rapporteur on the right to health (United Nations General Assembly, 
2017), the Health and Social Care Act 2012 in England and Wales as well as from the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD - Article 1 para. 
2 of which includes people with enduring mental health problems within the definition of 
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disability (United Nations General Assembly, 2006)). The choice of these examples reflects 
the fact that my universal account of mental health vulnerability is broader than mental 
disorder, mental capacity or mental disability. In concluding, I will suggest some future 
directions to take forward research on mental health vulnerability. 
 
I. What is mental health vulnerability? 
 
To understand the nature of mental health vulnerability, we need to consider first the idea of 
vulnerability itself. This is especially important given the “vagueness and malleability” 
surrounding uses of vulnerability (Brown et al., 2017, p. 498). At its core, vulnerability is a 
propensity shared equally by all human beings to physical, psychological and developmental 
harm, rooted in shared human fragility, fallibility and finitude (Bielby, 2008, p. 52; Rogers et 
al., 2012, p. 12, p. 19; Herring, 2016, p. 6). This is reflected in the etymology of ‘vulnerable’ 
in the Latin verb vulnerare, meaning to wound (Bielby, ibid.; Turner, 2006, p. 28). 
Vulnerability can therefore be understood as pertaining to a range of basic interests 
universally held amongst human beings - such as in life, food, shelter, physical and 
psychological health (Gewirth, 1978, p. 1158; Griffin, 2008, p. 90) - which can be met, 
denied or undermined by the action or inaction of others, and/or by factors beyond human 
control (Bielby, 2008, p. 52). It is a “universal” and “ontological” experience of the human 
condition inherent within and experienced by us all (Bielby, 2008, p. 53; Turner, 2006, p. 
109; Fineman, 2008, p. 8; Grear, 2010, p. 135; Rogers et al., 2012, p. 12; Gilson, 2014, p. 
15; Herring, 2016, p. 10). I will refer to this subsequently as ‘universal vulnerability’. 
 
Understanding vulnerability as a universal experience of the human condition “unites us 
across all our differences” (Fineman, 2014, p. 311). This is because it associates it in 
relevantly similar respects with lives characterised by considerable advantages and 
independence, such that of a highly educated, affluent individual in excellent health, as well 
as with lives where advantages and independence are significantly constrained, such as that 
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of an individual living in poverty with multiple health conditions. Put starkly, both can be 
killed, injured, starved, abused or oppressed, despite the glaring personal and structural 
inequalities between them that offer differing levels of resilience (Fineman, 2010, pp. 269-
273) to those threats. In this way, recognition of our shared vulnerability focuses on the 
fundamental similarities rather than the differences between oneself and the situation of 
others who experience particular adversity through, for example, the experience of poverty, 
discrimination, violence, abuse or mental distress. This recognition fosters solidarity and an 
appreciation of what unites humanity rather than divides it (Rogers et al., 2012, pp. 31-32). 
Yet while some question an understanding of vulnerability deriving principally from a 
predisposition to harm (Gilson, 2014, p. 8), it does not follow that the experience of 
vulnerability is necessarily undesirable or negative (Grear, 2010, pp. 129-130; Herring, 2013, 
p. 55; Heaslip, 2013, p. 20; Herring, 2016, p. 1). Indeed, given the unavoidable possibility 
and probability of experiences that threaten these basic interests, the experience of our 
shared vulnerability is personally and socially transformative, providing a foundation for self-
awareness and self-acceptance, inter-personal understanding and moral imagination 
(Nussbaum, 1996, p. 35; Hoffman et al., 2013, p. 8; Beyleveld and Brownsword, 2001, pp. 
114-117; Bielby, 2016, pp. 176-178; Gilson, 2014, pp. 15-16, and Herring, 2016, p. 43) thus 
“enabling the development of empathy, compassion, and community” (Gilson, 2014, p. 8). 
 
As the above example illustrates, some human beings experience elements of this universal 
vulnerability more acutely, and in some cases more onerously, than others. Fineman 
observes that “[v]ulnerability … is both universal and particular; it is experienced uniquely by 
each of us … our individual experience of vulnerability varies according to the quality and 
quantity of resources we can command” (Fineman, 2010, p. 269). This may lead to a greater 
likelihood that one’s basic interests could be undermined, denied or jeopardised in some 
way compared to others, amounting to a “reduced capacity, power or control to protect 
[one’s] interests relative to other persons” (Mackenzie and Rogers, 2013, p. 52 n.3). We can 
explain this greater exposure to not having basic interests met in terms of limited resilience, 
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which includes constraints on support and resources, to withstand or protect oneself from 
these threats (Fineman, 2010, pp. 269-273). On this account, resilience co-exists with 
vulnerability (ten Have, 2016, pp. 27-28; Lotz, 2016, p. 55), rather than opposes it 
(Ostrowski, 2014, p. 14) because resilience prevents our universal vulnerability from 
becoming all-consuming whereas our universal vulnerability highlights the contingency, 
susceptibility and conditionality of resilience. The contingency of resilience on social, political 
and legal factors points to a normative and relational understanding of resilience (Höfler, 
2014, p. 36, p. 45; DeMichelis, 2016, pp. 1-2) that is responsive to social injustice (Lotz, 
2016, pp. 57-58). It follows that the common experience of universal vulnerability and the 
common challenge to our resilience to deal with the shared threat to our basic interests 
provides the source of the ethical justification for appropriate social, political and legal 
responses to vulnerability that reflect this solidarity (Fineman, 2010; Rogers et al., 2012, p. 
23; Lotz, 2016, p. 57-58; Bielby, 2016). This distinguishes the meaning of resilience from a 
neoliberal ‘responsibilised’ resilience (Evans and Reid, 2013; Howell and Voronka, 2012, pp. 
4-5; Lotz, 2016, p. 57) where the individual is expected “to take responsibility for the 
emotional damages that marketisation causes” (Ecclestone and Brunila, 2015, p. 494). It 
also contests analyses that doubt the role that vulnerability can play as a distinct normative 
concept (Wrigley, 2015). 
 
Since the universal vulnerability we all experience exposes everyone to resilience 
challenges, a greater exposure to resilience challenges tends towards a heightened lived 
experience of our universal vulnerability (Dunn et al., 2008, pp. 245-246; Spiers, 2000, p. 
719, Bielby 2016, p. 178). Because the predisposition we all share to heightened lived 
experiences of vulnerability lies in our universal vulnerability, it is irrelevant if we individually 
happen never to experience particular forms of enhanced threat to our basic interests, such 
as starvation or homelessness – what matters is that we can because it is conceivable we 
could experience such adversity (Hoffman, 2014, p. 74). And, plainly, during the course of 
life we are all highly likely to encounter serious threats to our basic interests in some forms 
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(e.g. a severe illness), however much we may wish otherwise. In other words, while our 
unique experience of vulnerability is contingent on the resilience to withstand what happens 
to us during our life, what we are vulnerable to is not contingent as it is rooted in our 
universal vulnerability, which is constant (Fineman, 2008, p. 1). The recognition that aspects 
of universal vulnerability are experienced more acutely or onerously due to limitations on 
resilience which we all encounter further entrenches a solidaristic understanding of 
vulnerability (Rogers et al., 2012, pp. 31-32). Yet it also helps us identify those who are more 
exposed to constrained resilience, addressing the objection that “[i]f everyone is vulnerable, 
then the concept becomes too nebulous to be meaningful” (Levine et al., 2004, p. 46; see 
also the similar point made by Wrigley, 2015, p. 482). With this in mind, the right question to 
ask is how constraints on one’s resilience to cope with universal vulnerability are causing 
one’s lived experience of vulnerability to be more acute or onerous than that of someone 
else, rather than whether one is vulnerable or not, or how vulnerable one is. This question 
can be explored vividly in the context of mental health. 
 
Mental health is a core element of our universal vulnerability. It is central to our sense of self 
and capacity to have purposes that we choose and are of value to us (Bielby, 2016, p. 175). 
However, for a term that is used widely in public discourse, there is little agreement on what 
mental health actually means, especially when it is separated from medicalised concepts like 
‘disease’ and ‘illness’ (Tengland, 2002, pp. 2-3; Seedhouse, 2002, pp. 33-34, Pilgrim, 2017, 
p. 3). When used in a positive sense, mental health can be understood variously as akin to 
self-esteem, well-being, self-identity, coping, social acceptance and integration, and, 
somewhat circularly, not experiencing psychological ill-health (Seedhouse, 2002, p. 36). 
Additionally, some have observed that mental (ill)health cannot be understood in isolation 
from physical (ill)health (Seedhouse, 2002, pp. 45-46, Matthews, 1999, p. 55) or from 
cultural values (MacDonald, 2006, p. 15). The existence of a multiplicity of definitions along 
with the interconnection between mental and physical health have led to scepticism that any 
plausible definition can be offered at all (Seedhouse, 2002, Chapter 3). 
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Although it is not possible to explore these debates fully here, for present purposes I will 
understand mental health as the subjective experience of psychological and emotional well-
being that involves “individuals’ perceptions and evaluations of their own lives in terms of 
their affective states and their psychological and social functioning” (Keyes, 2002, p. 208). 
This takes into account the experiences of “the whole person” - including their feelings, 
beliefs, embodiment and social context - rather than merely symptoms (Ladd and Churchill, 
2012, pp. 22-23, p. 25; Seedhouse, 2002, Chapter 4). The idea of good mental health - 
which can also be understood as mental health “flourishing” (Keyes, 2002, p. 208) – 
depends upon self-worth, self-trust and self-acceptance/self-compassion which facilitates 
personal growth (associated in particular with the humanistic psychology of Carl Rogers) 
(Tengland, 2002, pp. 41-44; Neff, 2003, p. 91) as well as resilience (Joubert and Raeburn, 
1998; Tew, 2011, pp. 61-62) and hope (Snyder, 2002). Yet it is important to emphasise that 
experiences of unhappiness, dissatisfaction, sadness, fear and anger are “part of a mentally 
healthy life” as our engagement with them enables personal growth and positive change 
(Tew, 2011, p. 19). This synergy between mental health and psychological well-being 
resonates with the World Health Organisation’s definition of health, which extends to “a state 
of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or 
infirmity” (WHO, 1948) as well as with aspects of the World Health Organization definition of 
mental health framed as “a state of well-being in which every individual realizes his or her 
own potential, can cope with the normal stresses of life, can work productively and fruitfully, 
and is able to make a contribution to her or his community” (WHO, 2014). It also shapes 
definitions of mental health endorsed by the English mental health charity Mind (Warin, 
2013, p. 4) and the British Government’s No Health without Mental Health outcomes strategy 
(HM Government/Department of Health, 2011, p. 87). Most recently, the UK’s Mental Health 
Foundation affirms the subjective-evaluative experience of psychological and emotional well-
being, highlighting “the ability to feel, express and manage a range of positive and negative 
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emotions” and “the ability to form and maintain good relationships with others” as 
components of good mental health (Mental Health Foundation, 2018). 
 
A corollary of this account of mental health as subjective-evaluative well-being is that that it 
is psychosocial (or “psychobiosocial” (Kinderman, 2014, p. 4)) and dimensional. It is 
psychosocial insofar as it recognises the complex interaction of psychological and social 
factors which have primary influence on mental health over the biological factors 
emphasized by traditional psychiatry (Kinderman, 2014, pp. 24-25, p. 38; Johnstone, 2000, 
p. 35; for a discussion of the ‘biomedical’ model and its dominance see Davidson et al., 2016 
Chapter 1 and UN, 2017, paras. 18-20). On this account, “mental well-being is fundamentally 
a psychological and social phenomenon, with medical aspects … not, fundamentally, a 
medical phenomenon with additional psychological and social elements” (Kinderman, 2014, 
pp. 24-25, p. 38). By extension, mental health problems “are fundamentally social and 
psychological issues” (Kinderman, 2014, p. 38). Psychological influences include “past and 
present relationship difficulties, and sometimes a spiritual crisis of values and beliefs” 
(Johnstone, 2000, p. 35) whereas social influences “are the result of social injustices, 
inequalities and health-demoting policies that need to be challenged and improved” 
(MacDonald, 2006, p. 17; see also Friedli, 2009). These social influences are especially 
prominent in highly unequal, neoliberal societies (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010, Chapter 5; 
James, 2008). Most recently, the centrality of psychosocial influences has been recognised 
in the report by the United Nations special rapporteur on the right to health (United Nations 
General Assembly, 2017, para. 13, paras 19-20). The primacy of psychosocial over 
biological factors also “removes … the categories of ‘us and ‘them’” that arise from viewing 
experiences as “‘normal’ and ‘psychopathological’” leading to “a more sophisticated 
approach in which all manifestations of mental distress may be understood as part of a 
continuum of potentially understandable responses to challenging life situations” (Tew, 2011, 
p. 26). Mental health is dimensional insofar as it involves degrees of the presence or 
absence of psychological well-being, avoiding “a sharp dividing line between mental health 
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and mental illness” which allows us to “recognise that all of us, sometimes, have distressing 
and unusual experiences in our lives” (Cromby et al., 2013, p. 4). This reaffirms that 
everyone always experiences a state of mental health - irrespective of whether this involves 
well-being or distress - since the ebb and flow of one’s mental health is, like one’s physical 
health, an inexorable and pervasive element of the human condition. 
 
It follows that mental health vulnerability involves the psychological and relational resilience 
needed to withstand the perennial threat to our mental well-being and integrity in the face of 
life’s challenges and adversities. A subjective-evaluative, psychosocial and dimensional 
approach to mental health is consistent with this since one’s unique experience of mental 
health vulnerability lies in one’s evaluation of one’s affective and socio-psychological 
experiences and is shaped by one’s social circumstances and life history (and, to a lesser 
extent, biology) as well as the psychological and social resources one can draw upon to 
cope with pervasive challenges to one’s mental well-being and integrity. These influences 
are common to all but their lived experience varies, just as one’s mental health can vary. 
While everyone faces challenges to their psychological resilience, it is typically limited or 
diminished (though not necessarily absent) in heightened lived experiences of mental health 
vulnerability. In particular, where adverse social circumstances have a hostile impact on 
psychological well-being and/or one’s psychological resilience is constrained due to, for 
example, internalised shame, feelings of worthlessness or hopelessness, our mental health 
distress increases and thus our lived experience of mental health vulnerability is heightened 
(Tew, 2011, Chapter 7; Bielby 2016, p. 176). At their most pronounced, these deleterious 
psychosocial influences may - though not necessarily will - render one less able than usual 
to safeguard one’s own interests (Mackenzie and Rogers, 2013, p. 52 n.3) and/or expose 
one to a range of potentially intrusive or disempowering social, medical and legal responses. 
These range from social harms such as stigmatisation, discrimination, exclusion and 
exploitation to distressing subjective experiences such as a disrupted or “challenged” sense 
of self (Dunn et al., 2008, pp. 245-246; Spiers, 2000, p. 719; Tew, 2011, p. 28) as well as to 
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the possibility of coercive medical treatment under mental health legislation. Within mental 
health law, therapeutic jurisprudence has already considered the harmful “antitherapeutic” 
effect of many coercive approaches to severe mental distress (Winick, 1997c, pp. 1162-
1163, 1166). But it is precisely because everyone faces challenges to their resilience needed 
for good mental health to greater or lesser degrees that no-one is immune from heightened 
lived experiences of mental health vulnerability. This is reflected in Johnstone’s observation 
that “the roots of mental distress are intimately interwoven into every aspect of our daily 
lives” (Johnstone, 2000, p. 258). By understanding mental health vulnerability as based on 
universal vulnerability and an account of mental well-being which is subjective-evaluative, 
psychosocial and dimensional, mental health vulnerability is better equipped to avoid 
accusations that it is a stigmatising label – rather, it is simply a fact of life. 
 
II. Why mental health vulnerability matters to legal theory 
 
In Dependent Rational Animals, MacIntyre observes that “[f]rom Plato to Moore and since 
there are usually, with some rare exceptions, only passing references to human vulnerability 
and affliction and to the connections between them and our dependence on others.” (1999, 
p. 1). A likely explanation for this across much contemporary legal and political philosophy is 
the enduring influence of the rational, independent person of liberal individualism and 
classical social contract theory (Hoffmaster, 2006, p. 42).2 Such focus marginalises or 
negates vulnerability, an idea captured by Dodds, who observes that “human vulnerability 
and dependency have come to be viewed as evidence of a failing to attain or retain 
autonomous agency, rather than as conditions for agency and autonomy among humans” 
                                                          
2 Kottow, on the other hand, takes the view that “[v]ulnerability has been on the mind of European 
thinkers for over 200 years” (2004, p. 282). However, the sense in which Kottow discusses 
vulnerability appears to be as the product of competing and irreconcilable interests in a state of nature 
for which the idea of the social contract is a response. This is different from the idea of universal 
vulnerability used here. 
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(Dodds, 2007, p. 501). An explicit acknowledgment of vulnerability, beyond the recognition 
that co-operation with others in society is necessary in order to maximise one’s interests and 
security, thus creates a tension with ideas of autonomy and self-sufficiency on which such 
theories depend (Hoffmaster, 2006, p. 42). Yet, as we have seen, the facts of human 
vulnerability are pervasive and inescapable. Fineman (2008) expresses the point in a way 
which resonates powerfully with the impetus behind this article: 
 
“The vulnerable subject thus presents the traditional political and legal 
theorist with a dilemma. What should be the political and legal 
implications of the fact that we are born, live, and die within a fragile 
materiality that renders all of us constantly susceptible to destructive 
external forces and internal disintegration? Bodily needs and the messy 
dependency they carry cannot be ignored in life, nor should they be 
absent in our theories about society, politics, and law.” (2008, p. 12) 
 
Fineman’s question rightly directs our attention to debating the implications that universal 
vulnerability has for legal and political theory, repudiating the unrealistic and overly 
abstracted view of human beings that fails to emphasise the mutual reliance to which our 
basic, shared needs give rise (Fineman, ibid; Dodds, 2007). As part of accepting these 
“[b]odily needs” and potential for “internal disintegration” (Fineman, 2008, p. 12) as central 
features of a theory of universal vulnerability, it is important that they extend explicitly to 
encompass those of mental health and well-being to fully account for these central features 
of the human condition and to avoid a problematic Cartesian mind / body distinction (see 
further Grear, 2010, p. 117). In this way, theorising universal vulnerability becomes as 
inclusive as possible in its scope. 
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This inclusivity is also evident in MacIntyre’s work. MacIntyre highlights the significance of 
vulnerability in our development and flourishing (1999, Chapter 7) agents as well as the 
relevance of constrained resilience in determining the obligations we owe to others: 
 
“We need others to help us avoid encountering and falling victim to 
disabling conditions, but when, often inescapably, we do fall victim, 
either temporarily or permanently, to such conditions as those of … 
psychological disorder, we need others to sustain us, to help us in 
obtaining needed, often scarce, resources, to help us discover what new 
ways forward there may be, and to stand in our place from time to time, 
doing on our behalf what we cannot do for ourselves.” (1999, p. 73) 
 
Such webs of support on which we all must rely as part of mitigating constrained resilience 
help us avoid or minimise the impact of experiences which impair or disrupt our well-being, 
autonomy and identity or bring about other forms of suffering and disadvantage. In mental 
health vulnerability, (which I take MacIntyre’s reference to “psychological disorder” (ibid.) to 
be partly addressing), these webs of support can be understood as more specific 
instantiations of those that universal human vulnerability requires. They can be intimate and 
informal, as in the case of family and friends, as well as professional and formalised, such as 
access to counselling, psychotherapy or psychiatric care. In this regard, MacIntyre’s 
observations chime with Goodin’s arguments in an earlier (and similarly important) work that 
the wide reach of the “special responsibilities” we have, which are broader than those to 
family and friends, find their origin in the vulnerability of others to how we act and choose 
(Goodin, 1985, pp. 11-12). But given the universality of mental health vulnerability, these 
webs of support cannot be limited to experiences of mental health suffering - as discussed 
above, it is precisely because good mental health is precarious that it requires mutual 
support to elicit and sustain it. 
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Consequently, specific instantiations of support for mental health vulnerability encompass a 
range of practices. To sustain good mental health and prevent mental health suffering, 
mental health promotion is required (Tudor, 1995; Cattan and Tilford, 2002; Pilgrim, 2017, 
pp. 50-53), including public mental health frameworks providing access to preventive 
measures (Brown et al., 2015, p. 13; Pilgrim, 2017, p. 49; United Nations General Assembly, 
2017, para. 91(a)). In greater levels of mental health distress, it involves “multidisciplinary 
teams” (Kinderman, 2014, p. 28) of psychologists, psychiatrists and social care professionals 
as well as carers sustaining, affirming and empowering individuals who are suffering to 
facilitate recovery (ibid.). This could also involve peer-led forms of support (United Nations 
General Assembly, 2017, para. 83). But in keeping with the insights of the psychosocial 
approach, mental health cannot and should not be seen in isolation from deeper structural 
influences. To this end, a theory of mental health vulnerability must incorporate recognition 
of diverse social influences which serve to militate against good mental health, such as (but 
not limited to) inequality (Allen et al , 2014; Brown et al., 2015, pp. 52-55; Friedli, 2009; 
Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010, Chapter 5), unemployment (Paul and Moser, 2009), “high 
demands, low control” employment conditions (Marmot, 2016, Chapter 6), early life trauma 
such as child abuse or neglect (Plumb, 2005) educational under-attainment (Brown et al., 
2015, pp. 44-45), economic crises (World Health Organization, 2011), loneliness and social 
isolation (Brown et al., 2015, pp. 72-74; Monbiot, 2016) and living conditions (Brown et al., 
2015, pp. 42-44). The evidence that supports these social determinants of mental health 
underpins how mental health vulnerability and one’s resilience to it are inextricably 
influenced by social harms and social values. And since mental health vulnerability is 
universal despite it being experienced in ways that are particular to the individual (Fineman, 
2010, p. 269), no-one is invulnerable to these challenges to our mental health resilience, as 
one could conceivably suffer as others do (Hoffman, 2014, p. 74), even if one has never 
experienced, or will never experience, certain of these factors. The interaction of social 
determinants of mental health with individual psychological factors in the psychosocial model 
avoids “the individualisation and psychologisation of social problems” (Brown et al., 2017, p. 
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505) whilst fostering an appreciation that the level of psychological resilience, and thus the 
experience of mental health vulnerability, is likely to differ between individuals who 
experience very similar social challenges. In doing so, it addresses concerns that 
understanding universal vulnerability should avoid generalisations that are oblivious to 
context or circumstance (e.g. Dunn et al., 2008; Luna, 2009). 
 
Within legal theory itself, Del Mar and Fineman have, separately, sought to address the 
relevance and significance of vulnerability. Del Mar argues for a “relational jurisprudence” 
(2012, p. 64) which, similar to MacIntyre, recognises human interdependence (ibid. p. 74) 
whereby vulnerability can be employed “as a device to study law’s role in the quality of 
relations, thereby enabling both understanding and criticism of law.” (ibid., p. 73). Del Mar 
characterises vulnerability as “a factual-evaluative complex” (ibid., p. 63), observing that “to 
characterise someone as vulnerable is to take an evaluative stance, i.e. to think that 
someone who is in danger of harm or suffering is worthy of being protected against such a 
danger being actualised” (ibid.), where such worthiness is seen in terms of the particular 
context which gives rise to this susceptibility (ibid.). Since the factual dimension simply 
provides a concrete point of reference for the experiential context of vulnerability, evaluation 
appears to function as the more significant dimension. This normative approach, which Del 
Mar claims to obviate a rigid fact-value distinction (ibid.) is foregrounded elsewhere in the 
very basis of Fineman’s “vulnerability thesis” which is a moral argument “for a more 
responsive state and a more egalitarian society” (2008, p. 1) and is echoed in theoretically 
orientated substantive legal scholarship, such as by Collins who suggests in the context of 
family law “that identifying vulnerability requires an evaluative judgment” (2014, p. 29) and by 
Stychin in the context of tort law who observes that vulnerability can enlarge “our legal 
imagination in terms of how we approach the fundamental ethical question of our 
responsibilities towards others in law” (2012, p. 351). 
 
As part of the critical potential of vulnerability, Del Mar goes on to suggest: 
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“we can criticise law 1) by examining what vulnerabilities we think 
the law ought to protect that it does not currently, including 
vulnerabilities that have either already been recognised (except not 
by law) or by proposing new vulnerabilities as worthy of law’s 
attention; and 2) by being on the lookout for ways in which the law 
might itself create and / or exacerbate vulnerabilities, and thus 
reduce the quality of relations in different relational contexts.” (2012, 
p. 73) 
 
Mental health would seem to be precisely one such aspect of vulnerability that justifies the 
focus of legal theory. Indeed, Del Mar gestures towards it when he refers to “harms or forms 
of suffering that are psychological” (ibid. p. 74) as an increasingly frequent use of 
vulnerability (citing Turner, 2006, p. 28 who offers a similar view), claiming “we must 
overcome the theoretical bias to associate vulnerability with purely physical terms” (Del Mar. 
2012, p. 74). Del Mar’s claim about law causing or inflaming vulnerability (ibid. p. 65) echoes 
other views on the potential problematic impact of legal frameworks and reasoning in mental 
health, capacity and adult social care (e.g. Dunn et al., 2008; Clough, 2015), as well as the 
central claim behind therapeutic jurisprudence that legal phenomena “impose consequences 
on the mental health and emotional wellbeing of those affected” (Winick, 2006, p. 32). Yet 
what is perhaps most relevant within Del Mar’s argument for a theory of mental health 
vulnerability is the observation that “the law manages vulnerability, rather than simply 
protects it.” (2012, p. 76). This suggests a deeper and more nuanced engagement with 
vulnerability than conventional jurisprudential understandings of vulnerability offer (Hart, 
1961/2012, pp. 194-95) or which neoliberal understandings of resilience allow (“in which 
vulnerable subjects must train to be adaptable” Schott, 2013, p. 211) and does not suppose 
an unattainable quest towards eliminating vulnerability (Gilson, 2014, p. 16). Instead, it offers 
a more “proactive” (Del Mar, 2012, p. 75), basis for the relationship between law and 
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vulnerability, paralleling Fineman’s “responsive state” argument (Fineman, 2010, pp. 255-
256, p. 260, pp. 273-275). For example, opportunities for this proactivity exist in the 
legislative requirement enshrined in the Health and Social Care Act 2012, s. 1(1)(a-b) in 
England and Wales to promote a health service which has the explicit aim of “secur[ing] 
improvement … in the … mental health of the people of England” [emphasis added] 
(s.1(1)(a)) as well as “the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of … mental illness” 
[emphasis added] (s.1(1)(b)). As such, approaches to managing mental health vulnerability 
in law can be understood as extending to mental health promotion and preventative 
measures that are applicable to all citizens (such as those indicated in the report by the UN 
special rapporteur on the right to health (United Nations General Assembly, 2017) and by 
the Mental Health Task Force in England (2016) rather than being overwhelmingly focused 
on conventional ‘reactive’ legal frameworks regulating the use of civil detention powers and 
psychiatric treatments for people with severe mental health problems, such as the Mental 
Health Act 1983. 
 
Fineman’s seminal contribution also encompasses the idea of law’s management of 
vulnerability (2008, p. 1), though by focusing upon the relationship between universal 
vulnerability - specifically, the vulnerable citizen or “subject” - and substantive (in)equality in 
order to construct a justification of how and why the state should respond (Fineman, 2008; 
Fineman, 2010). Although questions relevant to mental health vulnerability are not 
addressed directly, Fineman’s distinction between vulnerability and dependency is 
particularly relevant for developing a theory of mental health vulnerability as the constrained 
resilience of heightened lived experiences of mental health vulnerability can often involve 
forms of dependence that persist over time – for example, on psychotherapeutic, 
psychopharmacological or community mental healthcare support and provision. This may 
lead one to question whether mental health vulnerability can be distinguished from 
dependency. 
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Fineman’s distinction between vulnerability and dependency turns upon the difference 
between universality and constancy: on this account, vulnerability is universal and constant 
whereas dependency is universal but not constant (2008, p. 9, n. 25). Rather, dependency 
occurs in an intermittent and unpredictable way and is “largely developmental in nature” 
(ibid.). Mental health vulnerability may still be seen as distinct from dependency for three 
reasons. First, the dimensional element of mental health in which psychological well-being is 
present or absent by degrees means that dependency will not always take the same form, 
be required to the same extent, or even be needed in certain forms at all. By contrast, 
mental health vulnerability is a constant feature of our universal vulnerability, irrespective of 
whether our mental health happens to be good, average or poor at any time. Second, the 
psychosocial element of mental health vulnerability draws attention to the social 
determinants of mental health which require sustained collective political and legal action to 
address rather than dependency on mental health care. As Kinderman puts it, “[i]f we are to 
protect people’s mental health, we need wider social or even political change” (2014, p. 39). 
Since the universality of our common vulnerability provides the moral impetus for political 
and legal action required to address mental health vulnerability, this suggests a progressive 
normative direction for Del Mar and Fineman’s idea of law’s role in vulnerability 
management, echoing Fineman’s claim that “analyses centered around vulnerability are 
more politically potent than those based on dependency” (2008, p. 12). Third, the subjective-
evaluative nature of mental well-being is necessarily a first-person experience in which we 
apprehend our own identity and its positive and negative changes over time. While others 
are needed to create and maintain the resilience to engage in this process, their involvement 
cannot be explained wholly in terms of dependence but instead by facilitating “positive 
interactions between the personal and the social” (Tew, 2011, p. 20). When combined with 
law’s role in vulnerability management, a constructive social context opens the possibility of 
giving all citizens - including but not limited to people who use mental health services - 
influence in terms of how their subjective-evaluative experience of mental health can be 
used to improve law and policy (e.g. UN, 2017, para. 42). 
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What emerges from the above discussion is a clear normative dimension to universal 
vulnerability in general and to mental health vulnerability in particular. Mental health 
vulnerability builds upon MacIntyre’s emphasis on webs of support in helping people live 
through heightened experiences of vulnerability (1999, p. 73) to encompass mutual support 
to nurture and sustain good mental health. Mental health vulnerability also harnesses Del 
Mar’s account of the critical potential of vulnerability for law (2012, p. 73) and Fineman’s use 
of universal vulnerability in the pursuit of equality (2008, pp. 8-9 and pp. 17-22) alongside the 
idea of “proactive” vulnerability management (Del Mar, 2012, p. 75) by a “responsive state” 
(Fineman, 2010, pp. 255-256, p. 260, pp. 273-275) to focus particular attention on the role of 
law in advancing social justice in mental health. This is manifested in relation to ensuring 
widespread availability of mental health promotion measures, timely access to meaningful 
and high-quality health and social care services and the wider collective efforts needed to 
address the social determinants of mental health. These collective efforts include non-
discrimination and de-stigmatisation policies (Bielby, 2016, pp. 179-180; Brown et al., 2015, 
p. 13), policies to reduce social and economic inequalities and related social injustice (Barry, 
2005, Part V; Mental Health Task Force, 2016, pp. 15-20) as well as to efforts to maximise 
citizens’ participation in the development of law and policy relating to mental health. 
 
In this way, a universal, normative theory of mental health vulnerability is capable of 
justifying appropriate legal and political responses to support the mental health of all citizens. 
It is also equipped to facilitate a critical evaluation of - rather than a mere explanation for – 
proposed legal and policy initiatives in mental health (e.g. Mental Health Task Force, 2016) 
and the use of the state’s legal powers in relation to people with severe mental health 
problems. In this sense, it supports the creation of resilience-conferring institutions through 
law (Fineman, 2010, p. 272) and resonates with law’s crucial function in delivering social 
justice more generally (Campbell, 1988, p. 18), a function which is frequently downplayed 
due to inadequate explanations of the relationship between social and legal justice and 
21 
“highly misleading” attempts to distinguish them (ibid., p. 10; p. 18). Indeed, such a 
normative approach is significant in its own right to justify claims about the desirable aims 
and values of law (West, 2011). For these reasons alone, mental health vulnerability matters 
considerably to legal theory. With this in mind, we can now turn attention towards the need 
for justifiable “normative framing” in relation to vulnerability discourse (Brown et al., 2017, p. 
502). This process grounds the “’progressive’” meaning of vulnerability (ibid.) in substantive 
moral and political theory to justify the values that a desirable theory of mental health 
vulnerability should embody. In order to do this, in the final section I turn to two mutually 
reinforcing normative features of mental health vulnerability - rights and care. 
 
III. The normative features of mental health vulnerability: rights and care 
 
Despite their alleged tensions (Brown, 2011, p. 316; Herring 2016, p. 1), vulnerability and 
rights are related conceptually insofar as the former can ground the latter. Turner, one of the 
few writers who have directly addressed this relationship, takes up this idea, affirming 
powerfully that “human and social rights are juridical expressions of social solidarity, whose 
foundations rest in the common experience of vulnerability and precariousness” (2006, pp. 
26-27). This resonates strongly with the account of universal vulnerability introduced earlier 
as it points to our shared experience of the fragility of human embodiment (Turner, ibid; 
Grear, 2010, p. 113; pp. 130-136) as well as the vulnerability of our agency (Beyleveld and 
Brownsword, 2001, pp. 114-117; Bielby, 2016) as the justifying ground for holding rights. 
Insofar as “[t]heories of moral rights are inherently theories about what the basic content of 
... legal rules should be [emphasis in original]” (Steiner, 2007, p. 460), it is important that we 
consider how universal vulnerability may deepen our understanding of moral rights as they 
apply to the context of mental health. This is due to the status of mental health as a 
fundamental interest common to all human beings (Bielby, 2016, pp. 175-76) and in order to 
harness their empowering and protective legal and political benefits for individuals 
experiencing any level of mental health – good, average or poor (Bielby, ibid.). 
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Similarly, vulnerability is also a concern that lies at the heart of care ethics (Herring, 2013, 
pp. 50-53; pp. 55-56). This is perhaps unsurprising given that caring can be defined as 
“everything we do directly to help individuals to meet their vital biological needs, develop or 
maintain their basic capabilities, and avoid or alleviate unnecessary or unwanted pain and 
suffering, so that they can survive, develop, and function in society [emphasis in original]” 
(Engster, 2007, pp. 28-29) which comprehensively acknowledges the ways in which we are 
all vulnerable. Yet much thinking in care ethics is reticent about harnessing rights in support 
of care (Engster, 2007, p. 53). This is a consequence of the moral primacy of relationships 
and inter-dependence, particularity and attention to context in care ethics above supposedly 
more abstract principles such as justice and rights (Held, 2006, pp. 9-13; Engster, 2007, p. 
2; Herring, 2013, pp. 46-47). But far from being “antagonistic” with rights (Held, 2006, p. 
140), rights and care in the context of mental health vulnerability are mutually supportive, 
rather than mutually opposed, for the two reasons I set out below. In bringing together rights 
and care, the normative foundations of mental health vulnerability are less exposed to the 
criticism that rights tend towards unhelpful abstraction and inattentiveness to context (Held, 
2006, p. 140) and, by emphasising the particular, less inclined to overlook the subjective-
evaluative experience of mental health vulnerability. In pursuing this aim, to echo Grear, we 
can bridge universal ethical and legal human rights norms and particular lived experiences 
(2010, p. 167). 
 
The first ground in which rights and care can be brought together as normative features of 
mental health vulnerability draws upon Engster’s account of having a rationally justified 
obligation to care founded on the moral right to be cared for (Engster, 2007, Chapter 1, esp. 
pp. 45-53). The advantage of this is that it has greater epistemological force to justify the 
moral imperative of caring to those who may be otherwise doubtful of its moral significance 
(Engster, 2007, p. 37). By the same token, those who believe that the moral motivation to 
care derives from empathy rather than obligation (Engster, 2007, p. 36) may be reluctant to 
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accept such a justification. But the “spotlight” that empathy shines can be limited to those 
who are close to us (Bloom, 2016, p. 34) - indeed, as Kultgren points out, “[c]are is too 
important to be left to the vicissitudes of family affiliation and friendship” (1995, p. 30). In the 
context of mental health vulnerability, despite noticeable improvements in recent years, 
ignorance, bigotry and stigma still all too often taint attitudes towards mental health, 
especially mental health distress (Dean and Phillips, 2016), highlighting an ongoing dearth of 
empathic and compassionate attitudes that can influence negative outcomes for those 
experiencing mental health problems (Goldie, et al., 2016, pp. 29-31). This lack of 
compassion is most starkly reflected in the levels of discrimination against, and the 
continuing social exclusion of, people with severe mental health problems in law and in 
society (Randall et al, 2012). Here, “a right to care” (Engster, 2007, p. 53) becomes 
especially urgent. Since this draws upon a rationalist rather than an intuitive moral 
epistemology, its explanatory power to persuade us why care should be a feature our moral 
relationships beyond those closest to us is enlarged (Engster, 2007, p. 37), remedying 
“parochial applications of our sympathy and compassion” (ibid.). This furthers the solidaristic 
understanding of vulnerability outlined earlier (Rogers et al., 2012, pp. 31-32) through 
highlighting the fundamental connection that exists between us all in terms of our mental 
health. 
 
Although Engster’s ‘right to care’ theory demonstrates one important connection between 
rights and care, he locates the origin of our moral duties to care in the nature of dependency 
as opposed to vulnerability (2007, p. 40). But, as explained in the previous section, 
dependence lacks the constancy of vulnerability, even though both are universal (Fineman, 
2008, p. 9, n. 25). Vulnerability has a broader reach as the justificatory ground for a right to 
care in mental health contexts for three reasons. First, the dimensional element of mental 
health means that a right to care arises both in cases of low of levels of dependency, such 
as in counselling or psychotherapy for transient and less severe mental distress as well as in 
high levels of dependency, such as in psychiatric treatment for severe and enduring mental 
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health distress. Second, a right to care also arises in relation to the psychosocial element of 
mental health. It does so in terms of vulnerability management strategies that do not involve 
dependency on mental healthcare, for example, those that aim to address the social 
determinants of poor mental health or minimise the prevalence of social harms such as 
stigma and discrimination. Third, a right to care supports the development of psychological 
and relational resilience by enabling individuals to understand and cope with their own 
subjective-evaluative lived experiences of mental health and well-being. Rather than 
involving dependency as such, it is instead concerned with “the internalisation and re-
enactment of positive experiences of empowerment, affirmation, achievement and 
connection” in “co-operative” social environments (Tew, 2011, p. 62, emphasis in original). 
These reasons highlight how a right to care can be justified more extensively by the 
universal nature of mental health vulnerability rather than the contingent nature of 
dependence. Accordingly, the basis of the “further argument ... necessary in order to show 
why vulnerability should generate an obligation to care” (Engster, 2007, p. 40) can be shown 
to exist in relation to mental health. 
 
The second ground on which rights and care can be brought together as a normative feature 
of mental health vulnerability fuses rights and care as a means to mitigate the imbalances of 
power in mental health and to reduce inequalities in the social determinants of mental health. 
These power imbalances are present across many aspects of mental health, such as in 
psychiatric classification and psychiatric dominance in mental health (Kutchins and Kirk, 
1999; Bentall, 2010; Rapley et al., 2011, pp. 1-5), to experiences of labelling, stigma, 
discrimination and the marginalisation of service user narratives (Johnstone, 2000; Sayce, 
2016) along with the differential impact of mental health policy and practice on gender, race, 
sexuality and socio-economic background (Tew, 2005; Ferns, 2005; Williams, 2005; Carr, 
2005; Morgan et al., 2016, chapters 5 and 6). As we saw in Section 2, inequalities in relation 
to the social determinants of mental health arise in terms of obstacles that undermine good 
mental health or prevent mental health thriving. Taken together, their influence has been 
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acknowledged recently in the report by the UN special rapporteur on the right to health which 
notes: “[t]he crisis in mental health should be managed not as a crisis of individual 
conditions, but as a crisis of social obstacles which hinders individual rights. Mental health 
policies should address the “power imbalance” rather than “chemical imbalance”.” (United 
Nations General Assembly, 2017, para. 86). This approach reinforces the psychosocial 
understanding of mental health introduced in Section 1. 
 
Again, universal vulnerability offers a promising starting point in terms of bestowing rights to 
combat power imbalances and inequality. Turner argues that “the language of human rights 
is ultimately the only plausible language for expressing the needs of people with impairment 
and disability” (2006, p. 90) since “such rights are based on … an idea of human 
vulnerability that we all share … as human beings” (ibid., p. 109). This universality is all the 
more important in the account of mental health vulnerability proposed here since it does not 
track psychiatric diagnosis or mental disability alone but extends beyond this as a subjective-
evaluative, psychosocial and dimensional experience of the human condition. It therefore 
supports the idea that mental health rights include, but just as importantly reach beyond, 
those conventionally associated with compulsory mental health treatment, mental disability 
and adult social care (Bielby, 2016, p. 179). But for mental health rights to embody the 
qualities of attentiveness, responsiveness and respect associated with care (Engster 2007, 
p. 30, see further Tew, 2011, p. 14) we need to focus on the specific context in which the 
duties associated with mental health rights are fulfilled. This better accounts for the 
normative significance of these rights as an ethical response to the unique lived experience 
of mental health vulnerability. 
 
As a consequence of the psychosocial influences on mental health identified in Section 1, 
mental health rights should include rights to access mental health promotion and prevention 
strategies (Bielby, pp. 179-180) that are available to all citizens. Care is central to the 
success of these rights. For example, public health psychotherapeutic initiatives such as the 
26 
Improving Access to Psychological Therapies programme in England (Clark, 2012) require 
attentive concern for the unique lived experience of each individual’s mental health distress 
in the client - therapist relationship. This involves a more particularistic understanding of 
what fulfilling rights amounts to than simple talk of a duty owed to an abstract rights holder 
allows. Additionally, aspects of care are visible in international legal human rights provisions 
relevant to mental health. For example, Article 16 para. 4 of the United Nations CRPD 
pertaining to protective measures to support the recovery of people with disabilities who are 
subjected to violence and abuse includes a requirement to consider “gender- and age-
specific needs” (United Nations General Assembly, 2006) as well as references to “the 
health, welfare, self-respect, dignity and autonomy of the person” (ibid.) which by definition, 
must be receptive to the particular circumstances of the individual to support their recovery. 
While the CRPD breaks new ground in how it recognises psychosocial disability rights 
(Lewis, 2010, p. 98), the broader implications of a care and rights-based approach to 
universal mental health vulnerability are all the more politically and legally far reaching. As 
Kinderman argues, for a society to foster “genuine mental health and well-being we need to 
protect and promote universal human rights” (2014, pp. 191-192), which means we need to 
view the scope of mental health prevention strategies broadly to address deep rooted 
structural issues such as inequalities in life chances and parenting quality, opportunities for 
meaningful secure employment and efforts to improve housing and the environment 
(Kinderman, ibid.; Mental Health Task Force, 2016, pp. 15-20). This highlights a very clear 
way in which current liberal legal systems would need to change radically to properly 
accommodate the values of care (Herring, 2013, p. 5) in mental health vulnerability. And, of 
course, such radical changes would require considerable political will in moving beyond 
socially and economically entrenched neoliberal values that have prevailed across much of 
the world for the last forty years (Schrecker and Bambra, 2015, chapter 6). Although the 
practical implications of this cannot be explored here, we can acknowledge that the relational 
approach which care brings to rights allows for a richer understanding and justification of 
strategies to address overlapping psychosocial influences on mental health vulnerability. 
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While a focus on rights that negates or downplays care misrepresents what respecting rights 
involves (see further Bielby, 2016, pp. 181-185), by contrast a fusion of rights and care can 
allow rights to “be used in progressive ways to protect and promote values of community and 
mutuality.” (Herring, 2016, p. 15). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Mental health vulnerability matters to legal theory so we can understand a universal and 
fundamental dimension of human existence that shapes the psychological needs of all 
citizens. But, equally importantly, it provides a normative foundation for how law should 
respond to mental health vulnerability as well as highlighting the challenges it faces in doing 
so. This makes the dearth of previous work bringing together vulnerability and mental health 
in this way all the more surprising. In response, I have sought in this article to develop the 
basis of a universal account of mental health vulnerability. I have endorsed a universal and 
evaluative conception of vulnerability, drawing on insights from legal theory offered by 
Fineman and Del Mar and have integrated this with a model of mental health understood as 
subjective-evaluative well-being which is psychosocial and dimensional. The common 
source of mental health vulnerability in terms of the challenges to psychological and 
relational resilience which everyone encounters explains how we all experience mental 
health, whether this is good, average or poor, as well as why some can be exposed more 
than others as a result to having their basic interests undermined, denied or jeopardised. 
 
The universal and normative account of mental health vulnerability I have developed 
consolidates MacIntyre’s emphasis on webs of support in helping people through heightened 
lived experiences of vulnerability (1999, p. 73), Del Mar’s account of the critical potential of 
vulnerability for law (2012, p. 73), Fineman’s use of universal vulnerability in the pursuit of 
equality (2008, pp. 8-9 and pp. 17-22) and the idea of “proactive” vulnerability management 
(Del Mar, 2012, p. 75) by a “responsive state” (Fineman, 2010, pp. 255-256, p. 260, pp. 273-
28 
275) to ground a socially just legal and political vision for mental health. This encompasses 
the promotion of good mental health as well as preventing the onset of mental health 
distress and acknowledges the social determinants of poor mental health associated with 
neoliberal societies. The substantive normative features of mental health vulnerability I have 
proposed involve a synergistic rather than antagonistic fusion of rights and care. A “right to 
care” (Engster, 2007, p. 53) overcomes limitations of empathy (Bloom, 2016, p. 34) in ways 
particularly relevant to combatting stigma and discrimination in mental health. Because such 
a right can be grounded more robustly in the constancy of universal vulnerability rather than 
contingency of dependency (Turner, 2006, pp. 26-27; Fineman, 2008, p. 9, n. 25), it affirms 
the fundamental connection that exists between everyone in terms of mental health. Care is 
also a means to realise to the content of rights concerned with addressing power imbalances 
and inequality in mental health, complementing the universality of rights with the particularity 
of care and highlighting the tension between mental health promotion strategies and the 
social and economic values of neoliberalism. Accordingly, this normative theory of mental 
health vulnerability represents an important way in which legal theory can contribute 
towards, rather than hinder, “a vision of a just society which is informed by moral indignation” 
(Hillyard, 2002, p. 656). 
 
Clearly, this article can only offer a first step in developing a theory of mental health 
vulnerability. Directions for future research include a more detailed consideration of how 
mental health vulnerability can be brought to bear on specific ethico-legal questions of social 
justice in mental health, such as evaluations of mental health promotion and prevention 
strategies and attempts to improve access to appropriate mental healthcare services, as well 
as consideration of how mental health vulnerability interacts with cognate ideas in legal and 
political theory such as equality, compassion and the right to health. And beyond the 
conventional focus of legal and political theory, phenomenological understandings of the 
experience of vulnerability (e.g. Stanghellini and Rosfort, 2013) may illuminate the 
subjective-evaluative dimensions of mental health in relevant ways to mental health 
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vulnerability. But what is clear already is how understanding mental health vulnerability 
deepens an appreciation of our universal vulnerability in legal theory and can contribute 
towards progressive social change in relation to improving psychological well-being. In doing 
so, it highlights what unites rather than divides us in terms of our mental health. 
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